

Reviews

THE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS by **Dominic Legge, O.P.**, *Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2017, pp. xvi + 261, £65.00, hbk*

One problem for the modern reader of Aquinas is that he expected his students to make connections between the different parts of his doctrine for themselves, and in that way approach theological understanding. While this freed the medieval master of needless repetition in his teaching, we today somehow stand in need of modern masters to point out the connections for us, so that we can be freed of the risk of failing to appreciate the richness of his theological vision. This important work, largely begun by Gilles Emery OP, especially regarding the Trinity and creation, has now been skilfully and penetratingly extended by his student Dominic Legge OP to illumine the connections between Aquinas's Trinitarian doctrine and his Christology. If anyone suspected that Aquinas's theology of the incarnation took scant account of the fact that it is the Second Person of the Trinity who takes flesh, or that the Holy Spirit had little part to play in Aquinas's elaboration of his doctrine of the Word Incarnate, then Legge is the contemporary master who provides a full and definitive answer to such misapprehensions.

The book falls into three parts. Part I concisely expounds Aquinas's Trinitarian doctrine and its relation to the economy of salvation, showing the eternal inseparability of the persons in their mutual relations, and the link between the eternal processions and the return of creatures to God through the temporal missions of Son and Spirit. Legge is thus well placed to establish that, for Aquinas, the One who is incarnate is very much the Word of the Father (Part II) and the Word breathing forth Love (Part III), who by giving us his Spirit leads us to his Father.

Part II judiciously sets the record straight with regard to how Aquinas sees it as most fitting, but not absolutely necessary, that it be the person of the Word who takes flesh. Legge ends Part II with an extremely helpful section on why Aquinas held that any divine person could become incarnate, but the bulk of his material is concerned to elucidate why it should be most fitting for the Second Person, precisely as Word, Son, Image, and Author of Sanctification, to be the incarnate One who conveys us to the Father through a filial mode of being and acting.

In Part III, Legge turns to the work of the Spirit who is given without measure in Christ's soul. He expounds this initially in relation to Christ's fullness of habitual grace, his beatific vision, and his infused knowledge.

However, Legge takes the view that the Spirit's grace is present in Christ's soul not merely because he needs it for the work of salvation, but fundamentally because he just is the divine Son from whom the Spirit eternally proceeds. In other words, it is as though God could not cause an incarnation of the Son without his soul being (temporally) graced by the Spirit's invisible mission. Here Legge distances himself from Jean-Pierre Torrell OP's account, where habitual grace is most fitting to the hypostatic union but not absolutely necessary (p. 143). Tellingly, Legge proposes no alternative interpretation of the text on which Torrell relies. While the texts Legge presents certainly show that habitual grace follows in order from the hypostatic union as a matter of fact, it seems to me that they do not quite demonstrate that Aquinas held that this grace had to follow *by absolute necessity*.

Legge is right to say that Aquinas taught that the invisible missions of Son and Spirit are inseparable, including to the soul of Christ, but when he concludes that the *visible* mission of the Son and the invisible mission of the Spirit must likewise be inseparable, there is a gap in his argument (p. 150). Aquinas bases the inseparability of the two invisible missions not just on the eternal inseparability of the divine persons, but on the fact that these missions share one of their constitutive temporal elements in common, and this he needed to do because divine missions are constituted precisely by adding temporal effects to the eternal processions. Thus Aquinas argues from the fact that both invisible missions take place by sanctifying grace to their inseparability (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 5 ad 3).

Hence, what Legge may need to do in order to establish the inseparability of the Son's *visible* mission and the Spirit's invisible mission, and thereby the absolute necessity of Christ's grace, is to identify a constitutive temporal element shared by *these* particular missions. Sanctifying grace would surely fail as a candidate, because the hypostatic union is not constituted through this grace, which rather follows the union, as Legge recognises. Until this gap in the argument can be filled, it seems to me that Torrell's account should be preferred.

Legge is at his best in his final chapters, which explore how Aquinas places the Spirit at the centre of his account of Christ's human action, and deploys instrumental causality to move beyond the Augustinian consensus that Christ gives the Spirit as God and receives him as man to the claim that he also gives the Spirit by way of his humanity. Legge emphasises the fact that Aquinas sees all of Christ's human actions as theandric and salvific, even the most quotidian. However, I do wish he had commented on the possible implications for Aquinas's theology of the incarnation of the two quotations in which Aquinas envisages even the angels' grace as causally dependent on the grace in Christ's soul (p. 220). Nevertheless, what Legge achieves in the final part of this book is far more than the conclusion that Aquinas does not neglect a place for the Spirit in his Christology. Rather, he convincingly demonstrates that Aquinas's

position successfully expresses the co-ordinated roles of both Word and Spirit in the perfection of Christ's humanity and his saving acts.

SIMON FRANCIS GAINÉ OP

THOMAS AQUINAS: A HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILE by Pasquale Porro, translated by Joseph Trabbic and Roger Nutt, *Catholic University of America Press*, Washington D.C., 2016, pp. xiii + 458, £59.95, hbk

St. Thomas would not have called himself a philosopher: his professional allegiance was to theology, and anyway in his view philosophers were pagan authorities. That did not prevent him, however, from using philosophy. Many of his writings show familiarity with philosophical works, have recognisable philosophical commitments, employ philosophical argument, and in some cases at least discuss particular philosophical works systematically and in great detail. As a result, Aquinas has frequently been promoted and assessed as a philosopher and now Pasquale Porro offers his contribution, a book written originally in Italian that examines the philosophical elements in St. Thomas's work and analyses them in their historical context.

Porro divides the book into six chapters. Each chapter focuses on an academically significant period of Aquinas's life and discusses his works from that time in chronological order. So the first chapter considers Aquinas's student years in Paris and Cologne culminating just prior to his inception as a Master of Theology (1245-1256). It discusses *De Principiis Naturae*, *De Ente et Essentia*, and his *Sentence-Commentary*. The second chapter covers Aquinas's first term as a regent in Paris (1256-1259). It begins with a small discussion of Aquinas's defence of mendicant orders, *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, but the bulk of the chapter deals with *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, *Quaestiones Quodlibeta VII-XI*, and the *Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate*. The third chapter covers the period from the end of Aquinas's term as regent until his assignation to Rome (1259-1265). It looks mainly at *Summa contra Gentiles*, but also discusses Aquinas's smaller and less well known Orvieto works such as *Contra errores Graecorum*. The fourth chapter examines the period from Aquinas's assignation to Rome in order to establish a *Studium* at Santa Sabina until his return to Paris (1265-1268). It deals with *Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia Dei* and *Summa Theologiae's Prima Pars*. It also discusses the problem of Aquinas's *Alia Lectura*, *Super Librum Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus*, *Quaestiones disputatae de Anima*, and a number of smaller works as well. The fifth chapter covers Aquinas's second term as regent in Paris

(1268-1272). It deals mainly with the Commentary on St. John's gospel, *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, *Summa Theologiae's Secunda Pars*, Aquinas's second set of *Quodlibeta* i.e. I-VI and XII, his Aristotelian Commentaries, especially those on *The Physics* and *The Metaphysics*, and his *Commentary on Boethius's De Ebdomadibus*. Again, like the other chapters, there is also a discussion of a number of less well known works. The sixth chapter covers the period after his second term as a regent until his death (1272-1274). It discusses the end of Aquinas's life, his death, and the subsequent reception of his thought.

Much of the book is impressive. The justification in the author's preface for studying Aquinas as a philosopher (pp. ix-xiii) is focused and correct. The discussion of mendicant/secular tensions in Paris at the time of Aquinas's inception is fascinating and helpful (pp. 53-56). The historical context Porro brings to Aquinas's accounts in his *Sentence-commentary* and *Summa contra Gentiles* of whether the Father's generation of the Word is personal or essential also deserves mention; Porro helpfully draws attention to Roger Marsden's report of the 1271/2 condemnation of the essentialist view, which both Aquinas and Peckham attended (pp. 140-145). Helpful also is Porro's assessment of Aquinas's intention in writing the Aristotelian Commentaries (pp. 339-340). Indeed, the coverage of Aquinas's works is so comprehensive that most readers will find value in it.

There are also matters to be concerned about in the book, however. First, several issues central to Aquinas's philosophical thought are not addressed. Thus there is no discussion of Aquinas's two attempts at deriving the categories in his *Commentary on Metaphysics V* and his *Commentary on Physics III*. There is no discussion of the relationship between the two accounts of individuation in *De ente* and *Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate*. There is no discussion of how organized Aquinas thought the body must be in order for it to be disposed for the infusion of the rational soul. And there is no discussion of the composition of *supposita*, in particular whether *Quodlibet II* represents a change of mind on Aquinas's part.

Second, Porro's assessment of Aquinas's views is wrong on occasion. Thus for example Porro writes, 'the difference between creator and creatures cannot be reduced to that between what is necessary and what is contingent, but must be located at another, more sophisticated level. Here we approach what is *the real heart of thomistic metaphysics*...' (p. 149 Porro's emphasis). But this is wrong. If the *actus essendi* is intrinsic to God's essence and extrinsic to any creaturely essence, then there will be a sense of 'contingent' which is applicable to any creature but not to God, and a sense of 'necessary' which is applicable to God but not to any creature, and that will be the case regardless of the fact there is another sense of 'contingent' applicable only to material being. In that case 'the difference between creator and creatures' can be reduced 'to that between what is necessary and what is contingent'. Nor is this

just a semantic point; it goes to the heart of the metaphysical structure of created being, and Porro makes similar claims elsewhere in the book (c.f. pp. 147, 157, 405). Third, Porro should have consulted a broader range of secondary literature. Had he done so he could have utilised Dewan's work on *De causis* prop. 9, for example, and thus come to realise individuality is far more central to Aquinas's thought than he allows (p. 93).

Overall this is a good work with some weaknesses. It deserves a place on a course bibliography but not as a principal text. There are better works out there: Torrell's biography deals with the history better and Wippel's monograph deals with the philosophy better.

DOMINIC RYAN OP

ON BEING AND COGNITION: ORDINATIO 1.3, JOHN DUNS SCOTUS translated by John van den Bercken, *Fordham University Press, New York, 2016, pp. 298, \$65.00, hbk*

Ever since the establishment of the International Scotistic Commission and its project to provide a critical edition of John Duns Scotus's *Opera Omnia*, students and scholars alike have awaited a complete English translation of the third distinction of Scotus's first book of his magisterial *Ordinatio*, known as *Ordinatio* 1.3. Published as volume three of the critical *Opera Omnia* in 1954, the importance of this text lies in its extended treatment of the various doctrines for which Scotus is well-known: the univocity of being, abstractive and intuitive cognition, and his critique of divine illumination. The need for an English translation of this important, yet little-read, text has been made all the more pressing in recent decades by the critique of Scotus's theology by 'Radical Orthodoxy' and those who seek to locate the genesis of 'onto-theology' within the early Franciscan, Scotist school of thought. The publication of John van den Bercken's complete translation of *Ordinatio* 1.3 in his *On Being and Cognition: Ordinatio 1.3* is, thus, a welcome and timely contribution to the somewhat vexed debate which has come to dominate so much of the scholarly literature concerning Scotus's thought, both historical and systematic.

As those interested in Scotus's thought will know, Scotus produced three commentaries on Lombard's *Sentences* during his short academic life: the relatively early *Lectura*, and the slightly later *Ordinatio* and *Reportatio Parisiensis*. Of these, the *Ordinatio*, closely followed by the *Reportatio Parisiensis* and the late *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, is generally accepted as offering Scotus's fullest treatment of his key theological and philosophical convictions, particularly with regards to human

cognition. Situating the *Ordinatio* within its broader intellectual context, van den Bercken's translation begins by offering a thorough introduction into the shape, content, and argument of *Ordinatio* 1.3, as well as its place within Scotus's wider literary corpus. Taking each of the text's different sections in turn, van den Bercken carefully situates Scotus's thought in relation to his principal opponents - Henry of Ghent, Thomas Aquinas, and Godfrey of Fontaines—whilst offering the reader an accessible introduction to key aspects of Scotus's thinking.

Following this, the translation of Scotus's text is offered with extensive footnotes and helpful cross-references to other scholastic and patristic authors, as well as several pertinent earlier works of Scotus, most notably, the *Quaestiones supra libros de anima* and *Lectura*. Scotus divides *Ordinatio* 1.3 into three parts. The first, addresses the possibility of our 'having knowledge of God' and consists of four questions. Namely, whether God is naturally knowable to the intellect of the wayfarer? Whether He is the first thing that is naturally known by the intellect in its present state? Whether God is the first natural and adequate object of the fallen intellect? And finally, whether the intellect can achieve certainty without any divine illumination? It is in the first and fourth of these questions, that Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being and his critique of the illuminist epistemology of Henry of Ghent is most elaborated. The second part consists of only one question: whether there is an image of the Trinity within every creature? Whilst the third part considers the soul's status as an image of the Trinity. It is within this last section, consisting of four separate questions, that Scotus offers what is perhaps his most mature discussion of the mechanisms of human cognition, focusing particularly upon the ontological status of intelligible species and the role of the intellect in generating cognition of external objects.

Highly readable and clearly presented, van den Bercken's translation is both faithful to Scotus's original Latin, whilst honest about the limitations of rendering complex scholastic language into modern English. As is well known, Scotus is by no means an easy, nor indeed accessible, scholar to read. The density of his thought and his tendency to use long, stately sentences, subtle in both language and argument, makes him a daunting figure with whom to engage. As van den Bercken puts it, Scotus is not 'brimming with compassion for the reader'. This makes the current translation all the more praiseworthy and significant. It offers a translation which is both clear and faithful to Scotus's original meaning. The occasional misprint disrupts the flow of the text, such as 'on' instead of 'one' on p. 127 and a missing 'to' on p. 169. These disruptions are, however, very few. Van den Bercken's translation is a much-needed contribution to contemporary Scotus studies and will be valued by scholars and students alike. It is hoped that when coupled with some of the recent secondary literature on Scotus's psychology, most notably Richard Cross's *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* (2014), which

draws heavily on *Ordinatio* 1.3, it will do much to clarify Scotus's historical significance and his relevance for contemporary thought.

WILLIAM CROZIER

VATICAN II NOTEBOOK: A COUNCIL JOURNAL 1962–1963 by Marie-Dominique Chenu OP, critical edition and introduction by Alberto Melloni, translated by Paul Philibert OP, *ATF Theology*, Adelaide, 2015, pp. xi + 163, \$25.00, pbk

DIARY OF THE 1914–1918 WAR by Yves Congar, notes and commentary by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Dominique Congar translated by Mary John Ronayne OP and Helen T. Frank, *ATF Press*, Hindmarsh, S.A., 2015, pp. 282, £39.95, pbk

In making available the journal kept by Marie-Dominique Chenu during the first year of the Second Vatican Council, Alberto Melloni has contributed significantly to the historical study of Vatican II. Simultaneously, he has provided valuable resources and provocative stimulus for continuing theological and especially ecclesiological reflection. His painstaking editing of Chenu's notebook, with comprehensive footnotes, has produced a text primarily of value to the specialist, but also of more general interest, allowing vicarious entrance into the unfolding conciliar drama.

The very thoroughness of Melloni's editing is occasionally frustrating - most readers will not need to be told that when Chenu writes *Belg* he means Belgium - whilst some of the anecdotal material is, at first sight, light-weight, even gossipy in tone. Thus, for instance, the story of the head of the Doctrine Commission being taken, literally, for a ride when a Roman taxi driver, asked to convey the notably conservative Cardinal Ottaviani to the Council, heads out of the city towards Trent. A smile is similarly raised by Chenu's retailing at second hand of a description of the elaborate liturgical functions in St Peter's for the anniversary of Pope John's coronation as 'Mass before the Holy Father Exposed'.

But Chenu's occasionally acerbic irony and his interest in the apparently superficial and ephemeral, however entertaining, should not be allowed to become a distraction. Those concerned with a properly theological account of the work of Vatican II will find much here to inform and nuance their evaluations. This holds true for those on both sides of most debates about the conciliar legacy. One does not have to be committed, as Melloni implicitly is, to a hermeneutic of the Council as event, to be impressed by the ecclesiological richness of the Melkite Archimandrite Oreste Kerame's intervention, edited by Chenu and reproduced in full in a lengthy footnote, on the original draft schema on the Church. Nor does one have to be as convinced as Chenu himself

of the exclusively and irredeemably 'juridical' character of that schema (and thus of an ecclesiological volte-face between this and *Mystici Corporis* on the one hand, and *Lumen Gentium* as it was finally promulgated on the other) to be struck by Chenu's early expression of the oft repeated, though contestable, assertion of the significance of the position in subsequent drafts of a chapter on the People of God. 'Conservatives' and 'liberals', proponents of hermeneutics of reform and rupture, all alike may find their understanding of 'what happened at Vatican II' both called in question and expanded by a careful reading of the notebook.

Chenu's 'notes like a journal' witness to the fault lines within the theological consciousness of the immediately preconciliar Church. Thus he records Aniceto Fernández's dismissal of the proposed new schema on the Church drafted by Karl Rahner amongst others as 'a text for a spiritual retreat, not for deliberation by a Council'. Chenu's estimation of the Dominican Master General's comment as 'a very significant remark, revealing his lamentable separation of theology (abstract intellectualism) from spirituality (living faith, Gospel)' encapsulates the extent to which debate between neothomism and its opponents had, by the early 1960s, become a dialogue of the deaf. At the very least, it is to be hoped that by highlighting this vitiating factor in 20th-century Catholic theology, the notebook might encourage contemporary ecclesiologists in particular to strive to avoid analogous potential stalemates in the future.

Melloni's introduction, setting Chenu's notebook in the context of both a typology of Vatican II journals, and a much wider historical perspective, provides further inspiration and challenge here. It is intriguing to note, for instance, potentially to the equal discomfiture of contemporary 'progressives' and 'traditionalists', that the use of journals first made its way into conciliar hermeneutics, not in the interests of amplifying voices from the margins, but rather to ensure a magisterially correct interpretation of the intentions of the Fathers of Trent.

The introduction also features a valuable of eyewitness accounts of the first day of the Council. Richly fascinating as the extracts are, they serve to highlight what is from the perspective of the early 21st century the shockingly insular character of the ecclesial culture in which all the conciliar participants were inevitably embedded, irrespective of theological affiliation. It is unthinkable, for instance, that even the least ecumenically minded Catholic commentator today would speak of 'the abbot and a monk from the Calvinist monastery of Taizé in Switzerland', as the markedly innovative Cardinal Lercaro of Bologna does in his simple and moving account of the opening ceremonies written for the youth of his diocese.

Such embarrassments are, however, the flip side of a very positive coin: namely, a vivid reminder of the necessarily contextual dimension of theology, including magisterial theology. As both Chenu and the other sources assembled by Melloni make clear, the documents of Vatican II were not produced in a vacuum, but at a particular moment in history, in

which the complexities and complicities of the Cold War loom large, and by men scarred to a greater or lesser extent by events on the world stage.

Something similar could justly be said about the latest volume of Yves Congar's diary to be made available in English. For the four years of the First World War, from the age of 10 to 14, Chenu's compatriot and future Dominican confrere kept a methodical, and occasionally dramatic, account of his life in occupied France. Replete with details of diet (and crushing dietary restrictions), descriptions of family and parish celebrations under unconventionally trying circumstances, second-hand accounts of wartime atrocities and self-confident poetic expressions of patriotic sentiment, it would be regrettable if the text were to be dismissed patronisingly as a touching period piece. This is not to deny its considerable charm, accentuated by the reproduction of both Congar's own illustrations and contemporary photographs. Rather, it is in its own right an intrinsically valuable contribution to our understanding of the formation of an influential conciliar voice. Vatican II studies will be the richer for its publication.

ANN SWAILES OP

THEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY: RETHINKING THE RATIONALITY OF CHRISTIAN FAITH by Lydia Schumacher, *Ashgate*, Farnham, 2015, pp. xi + 211, £60.00, hbk

Catholic responses to modernism argued that Aquinas's perennial philosophy provided an unsurpassed epistemology to support the rationality of faith. Lydia Schumacher agrees, but excavates the correlate impulse of the Thomistic synthesis, that theological ontology secures the rationality of reason, which is presupposed by non-theistic philosophers. The suggestion—obviously provocative—is that, even as secularised philosophy demands from theologians an account of their discipline's conformity to the canons of reason, theologians should interrogate philosophy as to the origin and basis of its claims to rationality (if not from some account of a transcendent good, then from where?). Comprising a diptych with her earlier *Rationality as Virtue*, *Theological Philosophy* again evinces Schumacher's creativity in drawing her mastery of Thomistic thought into dialogue with contemporary philosophical questions. The implications of Schumacher's proposals are wide-ranging, not because she offers an unproblematic resolution, but because she indicates with an incisive clarity the direction of travel towards a renewal of Christian philosophy and a more honest appraisal of philosophy's intrinsic limitations.

The thought of Aquinas is omnipresent in *Theological Philosophy*, not least in the account of the virtues as the (re-)integrating tools of both the

intellectual creature's natural harmony and their supernatural *reditus* to God. Above all, it is the predominance of Thomistic intellectualism that animates her work: rationality and the moral life coinhere, intellectual virtue has a moral end and rationality is 'deficient [...] when the commitment to the highest good that constitutes rationality is inconsistent'. This moral-intellectualism is conjoined with an 'ontology of becoming', in which humans are ordained to a state of constant movement towards realisation of their created nature, by the cultivation of rationality now conceived as intellectual virtue. The *reditus* to God of the supernatural life, then, implies fidelity to the *exitus* of creation. There are hints of a Rahnerian subjectivity here, with finite creaturely knowledge seeming to grasp towards the infinite and asymptotic horizon of all our mental (and moral) activity. But if Rahner's *Vorgriff auf esse* seems to prioritise *intellectus*, Schumacher seems more comfortable with *ratio*. In part, this is because Schumacher situates her point of departure more firmly within the embodied finitude of creatureliness than does Rahner: her investigation focusses on rationality under temporal and fallen conditions (hence her monotonous return to virtue as intellectual therapy). The beatific vision, as the eschatological consummation of the created intellect, should, however, have a greater prominence in the argument, particularly in investigating creedal reasoning about the redemption. Developments of Schumacher's thought will need to say more about the unthematic aspects of knowledge, particularly intuition and Newman's 'illative sense', but Schumacher has prepared a way for this in her treatment of affectivity and desire, not least in the examination of the theological virtue of hope.

With rationality given a moral (and thus teleological) constitution as commitment to the highest good (pp. 47-56), the transition from pro-theological philosophy to a fully theological philosophy can unfold, as if by the *quinque viæ*: the definition 'of rationality in terms of intellectual and moral virtue is ultimately a theological philosophy precisely because of [...] the divine transcendence' (p. 65). Some will see a circularity here: rationality-as-virtue presupposes the theological philosophy, which is itself derived from the account of rationality that it defends. Natural theology has a role to play in breaking this circularity (bringing with it an affirmation of the analogy of being, grounded in the doctrine of participation). The divine simplicity, knowable by natural reasoning, is precisely the highest good that is the asymptotic term constitutive of created rationality; its unity and eternity necessarily differentiating it from *ersatz* transcendence. Hints towards this absolute transcendence as the *sine qua non* of rationality can, it seems, be discerned from reflection on human rationality *ab intra* (but dealing with Kant is not much in evidence). The Trinity, unknowable to unaided human reason, is a more perfect expression of the transcendent ground of rationality, in that it affirms the capacity of the supreme good for self-communication. In turn, this self-communication of the infinite Good is actualised in respect of human

creatures in the Incarnate Word. These metaphysical ‘necessary conditions’ are reflected in the correlate transition from the cardinal virtues as ‘preconditions’ to the theological virtues as ‘sufficient conditions’.

As the structure of Schumacher’s argument makes clear, this transition does not render the cardinal virtues as a mere propaedeutic, untouched by grace and left behind in a mystical advance: charity is the form of the virtues (p. 163). A consequence of the theological life of the sufficient conditions is that the cardinal virtues operate with a new lustre, an ‘optimized capacity’. Here it is clear that grace perfects nature without destroying it, but where is the ‘entry point’, where grace and revelation enter to compensate for the failure of nature’s innate capacities? Schumacher’s account of simplicity, Trinity and incarnation as necessary *metaphysical* conditions of theological philosophy is well argued, but it seems they can only be known as such within such an antecedent revelation: perhaps Gottlieb Söhnngen’s ‘*analogia entis* within an *analogia fidei*’ could express this. It is, however, hard to shake off the sense of supernature having been naturalised and that philosophy is always already theology; there is something more than nature as ‘open upwards’ to the divine here. The way in which Schumacher’s arguments implicitly debunk myths of secularised reason and hint towards the necessary openness of the philosophical to theology is almost Blondellian, even if Schumacher is quick to affirm that there can be rationality outside of explicit faith.

The diptych coheres around a participatory reading of Aquinas, mediated by Rudi te Velde, and used to differentiate the metaphysically necessary authentic transcendence from the *faux* transcendence of ontotheology and pantheism. ‘Theology alone can delineate the transcendent conditions for the natural’ (p. 191)—or as John Milbank has put it ‘only theology overcomes metaphysics’. Is it wrong to read Schumacher’s diptych as a more trenchantly Aristotelian alternative to Radical Orthodoxy? Either way, her extraordinary work is of a commensurate stature and deserves equally wide reading.

OLIVER JAMES KEENAN OP

CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY by John Duddington, foreword by Lord Mackay of Clashfern, *Gracewing*, Leominster, 2016, pp. x + 225, £ 12.99, pbk

In 1964, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, then a young German legal scholar who would rise to great prominence as a member of the German Supreme Court in later years, published an essay in which he linked the emergence of the modern nation state with the rise of secularisation.

Near the end of his essay, Böckenförde warned that the free, secularised state is built upon foundations which it cannot itself guarantee. This axiom has become known as the Böckenförde-paradox. It became more widely known in 2005 when philosopher Jürgen Habermas and, the then still cardinal, Joseph Ratzinger discussed it in a now well-known debate on the dialectics of secularisation. Ratzinger went on to become Pope Benedict XVI, but kept an interest in the topic. As Pope, he returned to it during his pontificate in five major speeches, including the one to both Houses of the United Kingdom Parliament in September 2010. The speech caught the attention of John Duddington, barrister, Editor of the journal *Law and Justice*, associate member of the Centre of Law and Religion at Cardiff University and for many years Head of the Law School at Worcester College of Technology. The Pope's speech inspired Duddington to write the book currently under review, *Christians and the State. A Catholic Perspective for the 21st Century*, in which he tries to answer the question: where is the ethical foundation for political choices to be found? Furthermore, Duddington contemplates how Christians should contribute to the political debate and the challenges which it faces. At the end of the book, Duddington proposes a three-point programme of action to deal with the place of religion in the public sphere.

In the context of a renewed interest in jurisprudence in the relationship between religion and law, this book tries to cover a broad field of materials, while at the same time providing the reader with examples taken from case-law which help to bring out some of the issues at stake in a more practical and applied manner. Duddington starts by discussing the relationship between Christianity and the State in two chapters: one summarising the debate from the early days of Christianity up till the beginning of the Reformation, and a second one discussing the current situation. This is followed by a section on law discussing questions such as: is English Law based on Christianity?; the nature of Natural Law; Christians, Conscience and the Law. Duddington then moves to a discussion of the relationship between law, justice and mercy, and the relationship between the State and morality. This paves the way for an overview of hot topics in the relationship between religion and the public debate: equality, human rights, and religious liberty. Chapter 12 is especially fascinating, where Duddington discusses cases in which Christians and Christian bodies have come into conflict with the law in the area of discrimination. Here he discusses various national and international cases (*Reaney v. Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance* (2007); the *Lautsi* cases, and the *Eweida*, *Chaplin*, *Ladele* and *McFarlane* cases. Duddington presents each case briefly, but leaves it to his readers to ask themselves whether the claim by the Christian concerned was justified, or whether the State had a legitimate interest in the matter which overrode the claim.

Duddington is not an optimist when it comes to the position of Christianity, or for that matter religion, in the public debate. Following

Newbigin, he warns that behind calls for 'secularisation' - the stated aim not to grant privileges to any religion -, there can be a wider aim involving an attempt to do away with religion in the public square altogether. And so Duddington ends his book with a call for action. First, the churches should campaign vigorously to establish their right not only to be heard in the public square, but also for their right to seek to influence the content of legislation. Secondly, under the principles of the Human Rights Act, the churches should be granted the right to have their own legal systems in some areas, like the provisions with regard to Jewish marriages already in place that say that the UK courts may refuse to issue a decree of divorce if the marriage is not also dissolved according to Jewish religious usages. Finally, Duddington proposes a concordat between all religious groups and the State setting out the respective rights and duties of each other. Here, Duddington on the one hand praises the existence of an Established church in the English Constitution, but feels that, if the end of establishment is the price to pay for a settlement which would guarantee the place of religion in both public and private life, he, for one, would, with reluctance, pay it (p. 207).

Duddington is generous in incorporating non-Catholic Christian sources in his argumentation. This gives the book a rich flavour and potentially a broader appeal. But the book is, on the other hand, clearly written with the United Kingdom in mind. This might explain why discussions on the various European settlements on issues of Church and State, religion and the public square, were, perhaps for lack of space, not given the treatment that they deserve. Furthermore, the book often refers to the National-Socialist take over in Germany in 1933 and its consequences. It could have been even better though, if Duddington had given those German intellectuals a fair hearing who, before, and during the take-over, tried to resist these events, or who, like Böckenförde after the war, honestly tried to understand how a Christian heritage was either a stumbling block or a new inspiration for rethinking Church-State relationships in post-war (West-) Germany. Nevertheless, *Christians and the State*, stimulates the reader not only to contemplate theoretically the relationship between religion and law, Christianity and the State, but also encourages practical engagement with the issues at hand. Readers of this book will need no further convincing that this is necessary.

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PREACHING JUSTICE: Volume II. CONTRIBUTIONS OF DOMINICAN SISTERS TO SOCIAL ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY edited by Helen Alford OP and Francesco Compagnoni OP, *Dominican Publications*, Dublin, 2016, pp.573, € 40.00, pbk

The second volume of *Preaching Justice* offers a fascinating account of the work undertaken by congregations of Dominican sisters around the

world in their fight for a more peaceful and just social order. This offers an interesting and much needed addition to volume one, which focused on the work of the friars. The overall quality and layout of the book is a great improvement on volume one, where contributions on the work of French Dominican friars had not been forthcoming, and where the quality of the chapters seemed more uneven.

The broad sweep of this volume certainly makes for fascinating reading, not just in terms of the ministries and pastoral work undertaken, but in the variety of countries and cultural contexts which the sisters find themselves in. Although the book covers work across the world, from the USA to Vietnam, Sweden to South Africa, two particular situations come to the fore, the work of sisters in Africa and the chapter on the Dominican sisters in Iraq.

The work of the sisters in Africa shows quite how unrelenting their work of preaching social justice is. In two chapters early on in the book, in the section on sisters preaching social justice, the work of the Cabra Dominican Sisters in apartheid South Africa and the Dominican Missionaries of Africa and their work in Rwanda make for an interesting juxtaposition. The Cabra sisters spent much of the apartheid period working to integrate their schools and had been instrumental in working with the bishops' conference in the fight for equality. But just as the work of building a new and more tolerant society in post-apartheid South Africa had begun, the genocide began in Rwanda. This was a particular challenge to the communities involved, as their congregation had only just been formed from a number of other congregations. Their strength in the face of such barbaric slaughter is truly extraordinary.

To my mind the most interesting chapter is on the history of the Dominican sisters in Iraq, beginning with the request of three women to live together as tertiaries in 1877. The congregation was recognised formally in April 1929 when the last surviving of these original three was clothed in the Dominican habit. In the intervening years, the congregation had experienced the pain and suffering brought about by the First World War, and this found exemplary witness in the courage of Sausan Kaka, the prioress of the lay community's convent in Siirt, Turkey, who was martyred in an Ottoman death march as she protected the children attending the convent school. The congregation set up houses in towns and villages now familiar to us from news reports, with one of their first foundations outside of Mosul being in the town of Qaraqosh in 1893 and Batnaya in 1907, both of which were victim of ISIS's violent campaign of terror in 2014. The sisters have spent their ministry in Iraq strengthening the voice of women in society through their network of schools, and while this chapter relates much of this history, it was, however, one of the first to be written, and so does not take into account the most recent history of the sisters in Iraq as they dealt with the devastation of Islamic fundamentalism.

But the book also offers an opportunity to reflect on the mission of the Church, and the nature of the Dominican vocation. First, the book offers us a challenge to listen once again to Pope Francis's call for the Church to travel to the margins, but, as this book shows, quite often that margin is not in the foreign mission, but among the most ignored and dispossessed in our own society. The chapters on the work of French 'worker sisters' and the life their foundress, Elisabeth Voisin as well as the chapter on the work of Dominican sisters in Lille in educational programmes among immigrant communities reinforce to us once again that the margin can often be much closer to us than we imagine.

The ideal that seems to run through all of the experiences of these sisters is that of community. In his foreword to the proceedings of the 2016 conference in Salamanca on Dominican contributions to the promotion and defence of human rights, the Master of the Order points to the privileged place of community in our preaching. Our communities are to show not only that human beings are capable of the intimate communion of religious life, but also that this communion requires patience. Through all of these varied experiences and apostolates, in the face of incredible danger and state opposition, these sisters have cherished the life of their community and its daily observance as something which provides them with the strength to continue in their work, but also as the very means by which they are able to show to the world the meaning of a just society where human dignity is respected.

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